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ABSTRACT 
 
On May 2, 2007, a freight train carrying segments of the space shuttle's solid rocket boosters 
derailed in Myrtlewood, Alabama, after a rail trestle collapsed. The train was carrying RSRM 98 
center and forward segments (STS-120) and RSRM 99 aft segments (STS-122). Initially, it was 
not known if the segments had been seriously damaged.  Four segments dropped approximately 
10 feet when the trestle collapsed and one of those four rolled off the track onto its side.  The exit 
cones and the other four segments, not yet on the trestle, remained on solid ground.  
 
ATK and NASA immediately dispatched an investigation and recovery team to determine the 
safety of the situation and eventually the usability of the segments and exit cones for flight. 
Instrumentation on each segment provided invaluable data to determine the acceleration loads 
imparted into each loaded segment and exit cone.  
 
This paper details the incident, recovery plan and the team work that created a success story that 
ended with the safe launch of STS120 using the four center segments and the launch of STS122 
using the Aft exit cones assemblies. 
 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20080032810 2019-08-30T05:08:14+00:00Z
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Each flight of the Space Shuttle employs the use of two Reusable Solid Rocket Boosters. 
The propulsion of these boosters is provided by Reusable Solid Rocket Motors (RSRMs) which 
are made up of stacked segments. There are four segments per motor. These segments, which 
contain a solid propellant, are cast in Promatory, Utah at the ATK facility, are placed in railcars 
with fiberglass covers, and shipped to Kennedy Space Center. 
 
The train configuration as it left the ATK Promatory production facility is shown below in 
Figure 1. This cross country trek typically takes 12 days and covers over 2000 miles and 8 states 
as shown in Figure 1. The Timeline for this shipment is shown in Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Space Shuttle Sold Rocket Motor Segment Transportation Route 
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 Railroad   Date - Time   Arrival 
 Date - 
Time Miles 
              
UPRR Corinne, Ut 4/24 - 16:00 ~ Ogden, Ut 4/24 - 17:45 26 
  Ogden, Ut 4/24 - 20:15 ~ Green River, Wy 4/25 - 01:50 178 
  Green River, Wy 4/25 - 20:00 ~ Rawlins, Wy 4/26 - 00:50 133 
  Rawlins, Wy 4/26 - 01:15 ~ Speer Jct, Wy 4/26 - 08:10 175 
  Speer Jct, Wy 4/26 - 08:50 ~ Denver, Co 4/26 - 13:30 104 
  Denver, Co 4/26 - 16:15 ~ 
Sharon Springs, 
Ks 4/27 - 03:15 211 
  Sharon Springs, Ks 4/27 - 04:00 ~ Salina, Ks 4/27 - 19:30 244 
  Salina, Ks 4/28 - 21:50 ~ Kansas City, Mo 4/29 - 06:10 178 
              
KCS Kansas City, Mo 4/29 - 08:00 ~ Pittsburg, Ks 4/29 - 11:55 128 
  Pittsburg, Ks 4/29 - 12:10 ~ Heavener, Ok 4/29 - 19:40 210 
  Heavener, Ok 4/29 - 20:10 ~ Shreveport, La 4/30 - 07:30 216 
  Shreveport, La 4/30 - 08:40 ~ Vicksburg, La 4/30 - 14:30 172 
  Vicksburg, La 4/30 - 14:55 ~ Meridian, Ms 4/30 - 21:30 141 
MNBR Meridian, Ms 5/01 - 03:00 ~ Naheola, Al 5/01 - 08:20 47 
  Naheola, Al 5/02 - 07:06 ~ Myrtlewood, AL 5/02 - 08:45 8 
              
          Total Miles 2171 
              
 
Table 1. Summary of Shipment Timeline. 
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       Two locomotive engines are employed and a Business car houses the team of engineers 
assigned to oversee the shipment as shown in Figure 2. 
..
Locomotives
Business Car
(Warrior River)
Box Car
RSRM-99 LH/RH AECs
(UP57961)
RSRM-98 RH Fwd
(UP50022)
RSRM-98 LH Fwd
(FEC1000)
RSRM-98 LH Aft-Ctr
(UP50026)
RSRM-98 RH Aft-Ctr
(UP50031)
RSRM-98 LH Fwd-Ctr
(UP50025)
RSRM-98 RH Fwd-Ctr
(UP50021)
RSRM-99 LH Aft
(KSC710024)
RSRM-99 RH Aft
(UP50023)
Buffer Car 
(MP357361)
Box Car Box Car
Returned to Utah
Continued on to KSC
Train Configuration - Trestle Collapse Mishap
 
Figure 2.   Train Configuration 
 
 
 
THE DERAILMENT 
 
On May 2, 2007, the train carrying eight segments of the space shuttle's solid rocket 
boosters derailed in Myrtlewood, Alabama, after a trestle collapsed. The derailment was in a 
remote stretch of track near Myrtlewood, about 110 miles (175 kilometers) southwest of 
Birmingham. The train was carrying the RSRM 98 center and forward segments (STS-120) and 
RSRM 99 aft segments (STS-122). Each segment weighs approximately 300,000 lbs. and is 
protected by a white or yellow colored fiberglass cover during shipment. Initially, it was not known 
if the segments had been seriously damaged. Four segments (the 98A and 98B Forward 
segments and the 99A and 99B Aft Segments) dropped approximately 10 feet when the trestle 
collapsed, one of which rolled off the collasped trestle onto its side. Shown in Figures 3-7 below 
are photos taken at the site the day of the collapse. 
  
. 
 
 4
 
Michael E. Palmer / Tuscaloosa News via AP 
 
Figure 3.  Aerial Photo of Derailment Site 
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Figure 4.  Collapsed Trestle 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Segments On the Collapsed Trestle 
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Figure 6. Locomotives and Business Car 
 
  
Figure 7.  Position of Segments  
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(UP50022)
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(MP357361) 
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98 LH & RH CTRs 
Box Car
99 RH Aft 
(UP50023)
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(FEC1000)
99 LH/RH AECs
(UP57961) 
99 LH Aft Buffer Car 
(KCS710024) (MP357361)
Business Car 
(Warrior River) 
Locomotives 
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Hours after the incident, teams from ATK, NASA, local emergency responders as well as 
large derailment recovery team from R.J. Corman Railroad Group arrived on the scene to begin 
the process of righting the locomotives, business car and rolled segment.  Like building a Model 
HO train track, these highly specialized teams and equipment filled in the swampy ground, rebuilt 
the rail bed and laid short pre-built track sections to roll the involved cars to a safe holding area.  
The remaining cars including the four center segments were still on undamaged track and were 
rolled back to a secure yard several miles down the track. This coordination of  people, machines, 
trains and train tracks is represented in Figure 8.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Man and Machines 
 
THE RECOVERY 
 
The next task was to determine the health of the four center segments and aft exit cones 
that remained on the undamaged track. Each rail car containing RSRM flight hardware is 
instrumented with electronic data recorders (EDRs) that record data from accelerometers on the 
segments during transport. This data from the four center cars and exit cones was downloaded 
and compared to historical data to determine if any out of family events occurred. The data 
collected are shown in Table 2. 
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  Forward/Aft (X) 
(g) 
Vertical (Y) 
(g) 
Horizontal (Z) 
(g) 
Historical Maximum 
(21 thru 92) 
2.15 1.39 0.65 
98a Center Aft 0.90* 0.39 0.58 
98a Center Forward 1.39* 0.29 0.59 
98b Center Aft 0.74* 0.33 0.62 
98b Center Forward 1.41* 0.38 0.52 
 
Table 2.  Center Segment EDR Peak Acceleration Summary  
 
 
 As can be seen, the data collected was well within historical limits and met all flight specifications. 
ATK and NASA Engineers recommended the path forward to include 
 
• Create Disposition Logic Flow (DLF) action plans for each major component by work 
center (nozzle, propellant, metal hardware, etc.) 
• DLF is standard MRB tool 
• Identify concerns 
• Define actions to resolve concerns 
• Extract inspection, test, and analysis actions from DLF’s and define critical path 
• Critical path is PLI verification 
 
 
THE RESULTS 
 
 
This information was presented by the NASA and ATK Chief engineers as part of the 
Flight Readiness Review for STS-120 with deemed acceptable for flight with no dissenting 
opinions.  
 
The remaining four segments that dropped (98A and 98B Forward and 99A and 99B Aft) 
did show significant departures from the historical data and were returned to Utah for further 
evaluation and disposition after a difficult and delicate transload of the segments onto 
undamaged cars.  
 
The EDR data from these segments are presented in Table 3 and in Figures 9-11.  
EDR data clearly shows out of family and above engineering allowable (3g) condition. 
It should also be noted that the EDR data may not represent the worst case due 
to the position of the gauge on the motor centerline. 
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  Forward/Aft (X) 
(g) 
Vertical (Y) 
(g) 
Horizontal (Z) 
(g) 
Engineering Limits 
(STW9-14005) 
+/- 3.0 +2.0 / -1.0 +/- 1.5 
Historical Maximum 
(21 thru 92) 
2.3 
(Shipment 53a Aft Seg., 
STS-75) 
1.2 
(Shipment 77B Aft 
Seg., STS-98) 
.97 
(Shipment 67B Aft 
Seg., STS-88) 
98a Forward Segment 2.63* 7.48* 2.31* 
98b Forward Segment 1.65* 5.26* 1.44* 
99a Aft Segment 1.40* 7.73* 3.14* 
99b Aft Segment 2.07* 8.92* 2.77* 
* These occurred at the time of the train wreck, 2 May 2007, 8:45am MDT 
Table 2. Summary of Historical and Event G Loading. 
 
 
Alabama train wreck, event 29.
Engineering Limit = +/-3 g 
Historical maximum = 2.3 g 
Engineering Limit = +/- 1.5 g
Historical maximum = 0.97 g
Engineering Limit = +2/-1 g
Historical Maximum = 1.2 g
Figure 9. RSRM 98a Forward Segment EDR Data – file 98af02.udf 
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Alabama train wreck, event 37
Engineering Limit = +/-3 g 
Historical maximum = 2.3 g 
Engineering Limit = +2/-1 g 
Historical maximum = 1.2 g 
Historical maximum = 0.97 g
Engineering Limit = +/- 1.5 g
 
Initial Vertical Drop 
7.73 g’s Recorder failure starts 
Associated fwd/aft 
shocks 
Maximum transverse load was 7.73 g’s during vertical drop from rail failure with an associated 1.08 g’s fwd/aft. 
 
 
 
 
Side Impact Off the Rail 
-4.26 g’s 
Upper 
Limit 
Lower Limit 
Historical Max 
Figure 10. RSRM 99b Aft Segment EDR Data – file 99ba02.udf 
Figure 11. 99a Aft Segment EDR Data At Crash Time 
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Rationale for using these segments for flight could be accomplished if technical experts 
found support in the following areas: 
 
1) EDR Data 
2) Physical inspection of segments 
3) Confidence in NDE of out of family segments 
4) Subscale testing and Analysis 
 
 
EDR Data 
 
EDR data clearly shows out of family and above engineering allowable (3g) condition. 
It should also be noted that the EDR data may not represent the worst case due 
to the position of the gauge on the motor centerline. 
 
 
  Forward/Aft (X) 
(g) 
Vertical (Y) 
(g) 
Horizontal (Z) 
(g) 
Historical Maximum 
(21 thru 92) 
2.3 1.2 .97 
98a Forward Segment 2.63* 7.48* 2.31* 
98b Forward Segment 1.65* 5.26* 1.44* 
99a Aft Segment 1.40* 7.73* 3.18* 
99b Aft Segment 2.07* 8.92* 2.77* 
 
 
Physical Inspection 
 
Physical inspection of the motors can be accomplished and will Indicate gross failures in 
the propellant or case structural capabilities. However this will not provide access to the case to 
insulation or insulation to propellant bondlines. 
 
Non-destructive Evaluation (NDE) 
 
The NDE techniques employed for evaluation of these motors include but are  
not limited to radiography and Ultra-sonic techniques. These are primarily used to  
detect voids, cracks and inclusions  in propellant and insulation.  These techniques are not 
capable however of detecting “kissing” unbonds in the PLI system. These types of unbonds could 
be generated by high loads on the bondline during out of family environments (train derailment).  
Normally, process controls and subscale testing panels generated during the build up process 
serve as verification that bondlines meet requirements. Failure of a “kissing” unbond can lead to 
bore choking, increased propellant burning surface and potential castastrophic failure of the 
motor.  
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Subscale Testing and Analysis 
 
If the loads to which the segments were exposed were fully understood, it is possible 
that subscale tests could be used to generate data that could be used in models 
to show margins. However, as discussed earlier, the EDR data is not conclusive 
and higher loads were possible in other parts of the motor. Therefore, subscale 
testing would not be beneficial in clearing the segments in question. 
 
 
THE FINAL DESTINATION 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  STS120 Stacked and Ready. 
 
 
The Center Forward and Center Aft segments for RSRM Motor set 98 are shown stacked 
and ready to fly in Figure 12. Launch of this motor set on STS120 is shown in Figure 13.  
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Figure 13. STS120 Liftoff. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AFT Exit Cones Cleared for STS-122 
 
Aft exit cones 99A and 99B were in the still elevated, undamaged portion of the track and 
not involved in the bridge collapse area. EDR data was downloaded and evaluated and all data 
were below engineering allowables and well within historical maximums as shown in Table 3. 
Each exit cone was inspected for physical damage upon delivery to KSC  thus being deemed to 
be acceptable for STS122. 
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  Forward/Aft (X) 
(g) 
Vertical (Y) 
(g) 
Horizontal (Z) 
(g) 
Historical Maximum 
(21 thru 92) 
7.83 1.66 5.05 
99a Aft Exit Cone 1.96 1.28* 0.69* 
99b Aft Exit Cone 1.68 1.58 0.60 
  
Table 3. Aft Exit Cone EDR Data 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Instrumentation used to monitor the in transit loads were crucial in allowing NASA to 
recover and fly the RSRM 98 Motor set on STS-120 and the Aft Exit cones on STS-122. However 
the real story is the quick response and the coordination and teamwork that was crucial to make it 
happen. Truly the team, made up of NASA, ATK, RJ Corman Railroad Group (derailment 
specialists), Union Pacific Railroad technical expert, Barnhart Crane and Rigging Co., and the 
cities of  Pennington and Myrtlewood Alabama, worked as one unit with a common goal; the safe 
recovery of the Space Programs assets. This was done is such a profession manner that five 
months later, the segments safely delivered our astronauts into space.   
